How the Oslo Accords tried to find peace between Israel and Palestine

After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War resulted in the creation of the state of Israel, approximately 700,000 Palestinians either fled or were expelled from their homes, and the sudden displacement created a lasting refugee crisis that affected the politics of the wider Arab world.

Many of these Palestinians relocated to neighbouring countries or remained in camps throughout Gaza, the West Bank, and parts of Lebanon, where they often lived under difficult conditions and developed a growing sense of loss of their homes.

In 1967, Israel launched a pre-emptive attack that became known as the Six-Day War, and by its end, Israeli forces had taken control of East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and other territories.

This expansion contradicted the spirit of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which had called for Israeli withdrawal from occupied lands in exchange for peace and recognition.

Due to the resolution’s intentionally vague wording, which referred to withdrawal "from territories occupied" rather than "the territories", allowed for competing interpretations by Israel and Arab states. 

As a result, more than one million Palestinians came under Israeli military rule.

Although Israel maintained this control through checkpoints, settlements, and a strong security presence, discontent among the Palestinian population had grown steadily and considerably.

By December 1987, this frustration erupted into the First Intifada, a widespread uprising that involved street demonstrations and widespread civil disobedience that frequently produced clashes with Israeli troops.

Images of teenagers who confronted armoured vehicles drew widespread international sympathy and brought growing international scrutiny to Israeli policy. 

Internally, Israel faced growing division between those who supported military enforcement and those who urged for negotiation.

Meanwhile, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which had long been excluded from official discussions, increasingly received recognition abroad as the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people.

In 1988, the PLO issued a letter to the United States in which it formally recognised Israel's right to exist and declared a Palestinian state in exile.

This diplomatic step, though not addressed directly to Israel, enabled the PLO to participate in international efforts.

Eventually, external and domestic pressures had created conditions where a diplomatic shift became necessary. 

Away from the failed public negotiations that took place in Washington, a separate initiative began quietly in Norway.

In early 1993, Norwegian diplomats Mona Juul and Terje Rød-Larsen arranged a series of confidential meetings in Oslo between Israeli academics and Palestinian representatives.

At first, these discussions took place without official government oversight. Over time, they had gradually gained political backing and had evolved into a channel for real negotiation. 

The informal setting let the participants discuss sensitive proposals without immediate political consequences, because the lack of media attention had largely given the negotiators space to speak openly and to build a sense of mutual understanding.

As a result, the talks produced a Declaration of Principles, which became the framework for the final agreement.

It set a five-year temporary period during which a permanent settlement would be negotiated.

Senior leaders, who included Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, had approved the final version. 

On 13 September 1993, the agreement, which became known as the Oslo I Accord, was signed in Washington, D.C., on the White House lawn. U.S. President Bill Clinton hosted the ceremony and stood nearby as Rabin and Arafat shook hands before the world.

The signing was the first formal recognition between Israel and the PLO. Israel accepted the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, and the PLO renounced terrorism and recognised Israel’s right to exist. 

Under the terms of the Accord, Israel agreed to begin withdrawing from Gaza and Jericho in stages, while the Palestinians would form a Palestinian Authority (PA) to govern civil matters in those areas.

The PA would handle education, policing, taxation, and other administrative duties and scheduled elections would allow Palestinians to form a Legislative Council.

Meanwhile, joint Israeli-Palestinian committees would oversee cooperation. The agreement also opened the door for international donor support and led to the creation of new institutions such as the Palestinian Monetary Authority. 

Significantly, the agreement postponed resolution of the most disputed issues, and as a result matters such as the final borders, the status of Jerusalem, the future of Israeli settlements, and the right of return for refugees were excluded and left for future negotiations.

Still, many observers viewed the Accord as a turning point. For the first time, both sides committed to diplomacy as the path forward.

Rabin, Arafat, and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who had played a key role in the negotiations, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994 for their efforts. 

Two years later, on 28 September 1995, Israeli and Palestinian leaders signed the Oslo II Accord.

This new agreement expanded upon the initial framework by dividing the West Bank into three separate administrative zones.

Area A, which included major Palestinian cities such as Nablus, Jenin, and Ramallah, came under full Palestinian civil and security control.

Area B was placed under Palestinian civil administration but shared security responsibility.

Meanwhile, Area C, which covered about 60 percent of the West Bank and included most Israeli settlements, remained under full Israeli control. 

As part of the arrangement, the Palestinian Authority gained broader jurisdiction over civil affairs.

Plans were made for additional Israeli withdrawals from rural areas, and preparations began for Palestinian elections.

However, the division of land into disconnected enclaves created practical and economic problems for the Palestinian population.

Travel between towns often required Israeli permits and passage through military checkpoints. 

Meanwhile, settlement construction continued, as the number of settlers in the West Bank grew from about 110,000 in 1993 to more than 200,000 by 2000, and the associated infrastructure fragmented Palestinian territory further.

Many Palestinians had increasingly questioned Israel’s intentions and had criticised the agreements, which had failed to halt the expansion of settlements or to dismantle those already in place.

Opposition also intensified within Israel, since right-wing groups denounced Rabin’s willingness to cede territory.

On 4 November 1995, Rabin was assassinated in Tel Aviv by Israeli extremist Yigal Amir, who viewed the Oslo process as a betrayal. 

Several factors contributed to the collapse of the Oslo process, mainly because the agreements left too many key issues unresolved.

Israel continued to build and expand settlements, especially in Area C, at a steady pace, which Palestinians viewed as a breach of trust.

The number of settlers increased during the negotiation period, and the associated infrastructure, including roads and military zones, which only further fragmented Palestinian land. 

Meanwhile, militant groups, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, carried out suicide bombings and attacks inside Israel, and as a result these incidents hardened public opinion in Israel.

Government officials accused the Palestinian Authority, saying it failed to control violence, while Palestinians pointed to Israeli raids, restrictions, and home demolitions as proof of bad faith. 

Tensions deepened as the talks never produced a final status agreement.

Negotiators could not reach consensus on the future of Jerusalem, the fate of millions of refugees, or the territorial boundaries of a potential Palestinian state.

So, without visible progress, support for compromise on both sides weakened.

Oslo had effectively created no binding rules to enforce the agreement and hold either party accountable, which allowed disputes to remain unresolved.

In September 2000, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, which sparked large Palestinian protests.

The resulting violence escalated into the Second Intifada, and as a result the peace process collapsed under the weight of renewed bloodshed.

Religious claims over control of Jerusalem added to the emotional and political stakes.

Despite the failure of Oslo, several international efforts attempted to revive the agreement.

In October 1998, the Wye River Memorandum sought to restart implementation.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Arafat agreed on further withdrawals and security cooperation.

However, political opposition inside Israel and continued violence in the territories significantly limited progress. 

In July 2000, President Clinton convened a summit at Camp David where Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak made proposals that included withdrawal from nearly all of the West Bank and a shared arrangement for Jerusalem.

However, Arafat refused the terms, particularly over concerns regarding the refusal to allow full return of refugees and limited control over key holy sites.

Scholars and participants still broadly disagree about the exact content of the proposals and about how much sovereignty the plan would have given to a future Palestinian state, and no agreement was reached. 

Later efforts, such as the 2003 Roadmap for Peace and the 2007 Annapolis Conference, also did not produce lasting results.

The 2006 Palestinian legislative elections weakened the process further. Hamas won a majority of seats in an election that many international observers considered free and fair.

Clashes between Hamas and Fatah the following year led to a split Palestinian leadership, with Hamas in control of Gaza and the Palestinian Authority retaining authority in the West Bank. 

Since then, the Oslo framework was largely put on hold. Although both sides still refer to its language in public statements, few continued to believe that it could act as a workable basis for future peace.

The failure to reach a final settlement and the worsening political situation on the ground have moved the goal of a two-state solution further away.