Why the Second Crusade failed so spectacularly

The city of Edessa in the Holy Land fell to Muslim forces on 24 December 1144, when Zengi, the atabeg of Mosul and Aleppo, launched a carefully planned siege against the city’s weakened defences.

Count Joscelin II had marched north with nearly his entire field army to support an Armenian ally but left the city dangerously exposed.

The remaining garrison, which had been weakened by internal disputes and poor preparation, could not withstand the assault.

After several weeks of intense fighting, Zengi’s men breached the walls and stormed the city.

Many Christian inhabitants were killed, while large numbers were enslaved or exiled.

Contemporary Muslim sources emphasised the mass enslavement, while Western chroniclers reported widespread slaughter.

The victory raised Zengi’s standing throughout the Muslim world, and he took the title al-Malik al-Mansur, or "the Victorious King." 

News of the defeat had spread rapidly throughout Christendom, and the loss had shocked European rulers and clergy alike.

Edessa had held a special symbolic role as the first Crusader state established after the First Crusade, and its destruction showed that the Christian foothold in the East faced a serious threat.

In response, Pope Eugenius III had issued a papal bull, Quantum praedecessores, on 1 December 1145, calling on Western Christians to defend the Holy Land from further Muslim advances.

His message reached powerful courts in France and the Holy Roman Empire, where enthusiasm for another crusade began to grow. 

King Louis VII of France had committed to the crusade in 1146, driven partly by personal guilt over the brutal burning of Vitry in 1142 and partly by the opportunity to fulfil a long-held vow to journey to Jerusalem.

He secured the support of influential nobles and received official sanction from the pope.

At Vézelay on 31 March 1146, Bernard of Clairvaux had delivered a powerful sermon that had moved thousands of men to take the cross.

So many people gathered that a wooden platform had to be quickly built to accommodate Bernard and the crowd.

Many of those present believed that a new miracle would follow their devotion. 

Meanwhile, King Conrad III of Germany had also pledged to lead a crusade and had formally taken the cross at the Diet of Speyer in December 1146 after Bernard persuaded him that the war had divine approval.

With two monarchs involved, the crusade was the first time European kings led a major campaign to the Holy Land, though their leadership brought both difficulties and advantages.

Louis and Conrad commanded their armies independently, and they failed to establish a unified strategy or timeline for the expedition.

Their separate routes, plans, and goals soon caused confusion and disorganisation. 

Neither monarch had prepared a realistic objective, since Edessa had already been destroyed and could not be restored.

The decision to launch a major military campaign without securing adequate supplies or selecting an achievable target created a fatal weakness from the outset.

Crusading zeal remained high, but it lacked clear direction and reliable coordination between Western rulers and the local barons of the Crusader states, who often pursued their own regional agendas.

Odo of Deuil, a monk who accompanied Louis, later recorded many of the logistical and political failures in his account of the expedition. 

Conrad had departed from Regensburg in May 1147, and he had led his army along the Danube through Hungary and into Byzantine territory.

Emperor Manuel I Komnenos, wary of the intentions of Western crusaders after the events of the First Crusade, treated the Germans with suspicion and kept his support limited.

Skirmishes broke out when Conrad’s men looted local settlements, and trust between the crusaders and the Byzantines deteriorated quickly.

After reaching Nicaea, Conrad chose to take the inland route through Anatolia, where Seljuk forces waited in the rugged terrain. 

The German army had suffered a disastrous ambush near Dorylaeum in October 1147, the same site where the First Crusade had once triumphed.

Turkish horse archers attacked the disorganised crusaders in the mountains, and the Germans, unfamiliar with such tactics and exhausted by the terrain, panicked and fled.

Although some knights resisted fiercely, most were overwhelmed. Many died in battle, and others drowned as they tried to escape through narrow passes and fast-moving rivers.

The shattered remains of the army, estimated to have lost up to 90% of its strength, retreated to Nicaea, where Conrad became ill and withdrew to Constantinople. 

Louis VII had begun his crusade in June 1147 and had followed a similar route. He avoided conflict with the Byzantines by maintaining stricter discipline among his troops, but his forces suffered terribly in Anatolia.

In January 1148, the French army became trapped in a narrow gorge near Mount Cadmus, close to Laodicea, and faced a continuous Turkish assault.

Poor leadership and unfamiliar terrain led to a chaotic retreat, and many soldiers drowned or perished during the crossing of icy rivers and steep ravines.

Louis himself narrowly escaped, and only a small portion of his army survived the ordeal. 

When Louis reached Attalia on the Mediterranean coast, he abandoned most of his remaining troops and boarded a ship to Antioch.

The journey had exposed the lack of strategic preparation and the inability of the leaders to anticipate or overcome natural and military obstacles.

Instead of arriving in the Holy Land as a powerful military force, the crusaders arrived battered and demoralised, and their forces were divided. 

Tensions rose at Antioch when Louis met Raymond of Poitiers, the Prince of Antioch.

Raymond urged him to lead an offensive against Aleppo, the key city in northern Syria that was being used as Nur ad-Din’s power base.

Louis refused and insisted that he travel to Jerusalem instead, which caused open disagreement.

Eleanor of Aquitaine, who was both Louis’s wife and Raymond’s niece, supported Raymond’s plan, and rumours of an inappropriate closeness between the two intensified the conflict.

Some chroniclers even suggested that Eleanor considered whether she should remain in Antioch. 

The rift between Louis and Raymond began a wider pattern of personal rivalries and strategic confusion.

Once Louis reached Jerusalem and met Conrad, who had recovered from illness, the two kings failed to create a coherent plan.

Baldwin III of Jerusalem and the High Court of the Kingdom met with the monarchs at a council held at Palmarea near Acre in June 1148, but the decision they reached surprised many observers.

Rather than targeting Aleppo or attempting a recovery of Edessa, the leaders chose to march against Damascus. 

The city of Damascus had previously allied with the Crusader states against Zengi, but relations worsened after Zengi’s death.

Local barons questioned the wisdom of attacking a former ally and doubted whether the city could be held even if captured.

The decision showed a fatal misunderstanding of the region’s politics and indicated that the crusade’s leaders lacked both knowledge and flexibility.

Although Baldwin III and his court likely proposed the target to protect their territory, the decision lacked unified support.

No clear objective united the commanders, and no shared strategy directed their movements. 

Crusader forces marched from Tiberias to Damascus and arrived outside the city in late July 1148.

They launched their attack from the western side, near the Bab al-Jabiya gate, where orchards and irrigation channels offered cover but complicated troop movements.

Damascus was surrounded by well-maintained gardens and fed by the Barada River, but had effective defences and a determined garrison.

The crusaders struggled to advance through narrow lanes and thick undergrowth, and they soon encountered fierce resistance. 

Unfortunately, food and water grew scarce within a few days, and the leaders made a disastrous choice.

They abandoned the western approach and repositioned their forces on the eastern side of the city because they mistakenly believed that the defences would be weaker there.

The new position offered no access to water and exposed the troops to open counterattacks.

Morale collapsed, and arguments broke out among the barons and commanders, many of whom no longer trusted the motives of their fellow leaders.

Some may have even negotiated privately with Damascus. 

Reports that Nur ad-Din was bringing reinforcements reached the camp, and panic spread.

The siege collapsed after four days, and the crusaders withdrew in disorder. The retreat was a military defeat and a complete political and religious failure.

The barons of the Crusader states blamed the Western monarchs for their indecision, and the crusade ended without achieving any significant military or diplomatic gains. 

After the failure at Damascus, the French and German contingents quickly dissolved.

Conrad returned to Constantinople and departed for Germany, where his reputation suffered as a result of the expedition’s outcome.

Louis VII remained in the Levant until the spring of 1149, but he took no further military action.

His relationship with Eleanor of Aquitaine collapsed shortly after their return, and they formally separated in 1152. 

Bernard of Clairvaux, who had preached the crusade with great conviction, came under heavy criticism.

He defended his actions by accusing the crusaders of moral failings that had provoked divine punishment.

Although this explanation satisfied some Church officials, but many ordinary Christians began to question papal authority and crusading promises.

Public enthusiasm for future crusades began to fade, and papal appeals no longer carried the same authority.

In northern Europe, some crusaders had already diverted their efforts to local campaigns, such as the Wendish Crusade against Slavic pagans in 1147. 

In the aftermath of the crusade, the political and military position of the Crusader states grew increasingly fragile.

By attacking Damascus, the crusaders had destroyed any chance of an alliance with its leaders, and within a few years, the city fell under the control of Nur ad-Din.

He then became the most powerful Muslim ruler in Syria and, after uniting Aleppo and Damascus in 1154, directed his attention toward strengthening Muslim resistance against the Latin states. 

Baldwin III eventually asserted full control over the Kingdom of Jerusalem, but his reign faced constant threats from Muslim forces and internal dissent.

The barons, still distrustful of outside interference, struggled to maintain their strongholds and protect vital trade routes.

With Edessa permanently lost and Antioch weakened, the Crusader states no longer had the capacity to launch offensive campaigns or secure reliable reinforcements.

Defensive strongholds like Krak des Chevaliers were reinforced, but they could not reverse the overall strategic decline. 

Over time, the failure of the Second Crusade contributed to a shift in the balance of power.

The Muslim states grew more united under leaders like Nur ad-Din and Saladin, while the Christian states in the East became increasingly isolated.

The disastrous decisions made in 1148 haunted the Latin states for decades and influenced the strategies of future crusades, including the Third Crusade, which arose after the fall of Jerusalem in 1187.