How the Soviets crushed the Nazis at Kursk, the largest tank battle of WWII

After the disastrous loss at Stalingrad earlier in 1943, German command needed a military win to restore the Eastern Front and boost morale among its troops.

Kursk, which pushed into German territory in a broad bulge between Orel and Belgorod, gave a tempting chance for encirclement.

Hitler postponed the start of the attack several times to wait for the new Panther and Tiger tanks because he hoped their heavier armour and stronger guns would break Soviet defences.

These tanks, however, had many engine problems and often failed before reaching the battlefield.

His commanders, especially General Model in the north and Manstein with General Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army in the south, believed that a quick, focused strike on the flanks of the bulge would let them surround Soviet forces. 

For Stalin and his senior commanders, Kursk held a different level of importance.

Their goal had moved past survival. Soviet leaders planned to deliver a blow that would destroy German tank power and open the path for a steady counter-attack.

General Rokossovsky's Central Front and General Vatutin's Voronezh Front reported to Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevsky, who managed Soviet defences and reserves.

The Red Army used the extra time to lay over 500,000 mines, dig thousands of kilometres of trenches and position guns and anti-tank weapons along the likely German routes.

Soviet plans depended on wearing down German forces through constant pressure before starting their own attack. 

Before the fighting began, German forces under Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, who led Army Group Centre, and General Erich von Manstein, who led Army Group South, believed that a large pincer movement could destroy Soviet forces in the area and regain momentum on the Eastern Front.

Operation Citadel aimed to surround and destroy the Soviet forces within the Kursk salient, where Red Army positions pushed into German-held land.

However, Soviet spies and decrypted messages had already revealed the German plans.

As a result, the Red Army built several layers of defence, including at least three main lines with reserves behind them that covered thousands of kilometres of trenches and were protected by more than 500,000 mines.

Those defences greatly slowed and damaged the advancing German army. 

On 5 July 1943, German forces launched their offensive with a heavy artillery barrage followed by armoured spearheads.

In the north, General Model’s Ninth Army pushed against Soviet Central Front defences around the town of Ponyri.

The advance soon stalled under intense fire from anti-tank guns, artillery, and Soviet infantry positioned in trenches arranged in layers.

German progress in this sector never exceeded 10 kilometres. Fierce resistance, combined with the destruction of tanks and vehicles by minefields and air strikes, eventually led to the failure of the northern attack. 

In the south, Manstein’s Army Group South made greater early gains. The II SS Panzer Corps, which included specialised units such as the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions, advanced toward Prokhorovka.

By 12 July, one of the most fierce tank clashes of the war erupted on the plains near the town.

Approximately 850 Soviet tanks fought fewer than 300 German tanks in close combat in a wild, dusty battle that left hundreds of vehicles in flames.

Although the Germans destroyed many Soviet tanks, they failed to achieve a breakthrough.

Soviet reserves continued to arrive in waves, and the Red Air Force, particularly the 2nd and 16th Air Armies, increased its air control, which targeted German supply routes, fuel depots, and rear positions.

Luftwaffe forces under General Wolfram von Richthofen, though experienced, could not make up for mounting aircraft losses and dwindling fuel. 

At Kursk, German tactics that had worked earlier in the war collapsed under the weight of Soviet defence and determination.

Blitzkrieg strategy relied on rapid armoured breakthroughs supported by air power and encirclement of enemy forces.

The Soviet defence-in-depth approach absorbed these attacks. By the time German tanks reached the second and third Soviet defence belts, they had lost momentum.

Their heavy tanks frequently broke down or became trapped in narrow corridors, while Soviet artillery caused heavy casualties. 

Supply strain also made a crucial difference. German formations, especially in the south, lacked the fuel needed to maintain their offensive and had no spare parts or reinforcements.

The long delay before they launched Operation Citadel allowed the Soviets to build up larger reserves than the Germans could match.

Once the Wehrmacht’s attack weakened, the Soviets launched counter-attacks from the flanks.

Operation Kutuzov began on 12 July in the north to eliminate the Orel bulge, and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev followed in early August to free Belgorod and Kharkov.

These coordinated attacks forced German forces into a retreat that they would never reverse.

Combined German losses during the Citadel phase of the battle reached approximately 50,000 to 57,000 men, 300 to 500 tanks, and hundreds of aircraft.

Soviet casualties during the broader Kursk campaign exceeded 170,000 men and included thousands of tank losses. 

After Kursk, German forces no longer held the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front.

From August 1943 onward, the Red Army advanced westward in a series of campaigns that eventually carried it to Berlin.

German attempts to recover lost ground failed, and Hitler's gamble on a final battle ended in exhaustion and retreat.

The Allied landing in Sicily on 10 July, which had already prompted preparations to redeploy special divisions, accelerated the withdrawal of key German units from the Eastern Front and further weakened their position.

The Wehrmacht lost thousands of tanks it could not replace, and veteran soldiers, and the defeat had a marked effect on morale and command confidence. 

For the Soviet Union, the victory at Kursk showed that its factories had recovered and that its army had grown into a force able to defend and launch major attacks.

Stalin began to trust his generals more fully, especially Zhukov and Vasilevsky, whose planning proved effective.

The battle also proved that Soviet industry could produce tanks and aircraft in numbers that overwhelmed German production.

Kursk did not end the war, but it marked the start of a Soviet advance that pushed back the Nazi regime on every front.