The Valley of Tears: Israel’s desperate defence of the Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War

A roadside sign marks the entrance to the Golan area near dry hills and sparse vegetation.
Golan Heights, Israel. Source: https://pixabay.com/photos/israel-golan-landscape-highway-4601452/

Amid the rugged ridges and bare basalt plateaus of the Golan Heights, where Syrian artillery had already reportedly struck Israeli outposts by sunrise, an armoured battle unfolded that threatened northern Israel's survival.

 

On 6 October 1973, as Israeli families gathered to observe Yom Kippur, over 1,400 Syrian tanks, according to some estimates, supported by infantry battalions and heavy artillery surged across the ceasefire line to try to take back land lost in the Six-Day War.

 

The Syrian 1st Corps, which operated under the overall control of Minister of Defense Mustafa Tlas and was commanded in the field by junior officers, deployed the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 9th Divisions.

 

Estimates of Syrian artillery support vary considerably, though hundreds of guns, rocket launchers, and mortars were positioned along the front. 

How Syria attacked the Golan Heights

Only around 177 Israeli tanks covered the entire Golan front, with fewer than 40 in the northern sector.

 

The Israeli Defence Forces had left the Golan Heights partially manned for religious reasons and a recent assessment by military intelligence that an attack was unlikely.

 

Syrian formations belonging to the 1st and 3rd Armoured Divisions crossed into Israeli territory, striking the northern sector between Mount Hermon and the Quneitra Gap.

 

There, the terrain largely forced the attack into a narrow front and increased pressure on Israeli armoured brigades that tried to hold back the advance with limited reserves and no aerial cover during the initial phase. 

Within this critical area, Colonel Avigdor Ben-Gal’s 7th Armoured Brigade had organised a defence with very little time.

 

With roughly 180 tanks available, the brigade had positioned its British Centurion and American M48 Patton tanks in hull-down positions behind ridgelines.

 

The brigade had used overlapping fire and coordinated movement effectively to counter the momentum of the Syrian offensive.

 

Israeli tank crews, who were outnumbered, had extensive combat experience and had relied on rapid target acquisition and local decision-making.

 

The Syrian forces were equipped with T-55s, T-62s, and older T-34s, whcih had the advantage of night-vision equipment and advanced fire-control systems supplied by the Soviet Union. 

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Tel Saki tactical response

Soon after the first failed Syrian attack, a second wave advanced with greater coordination and heavier artillery support, once more aiming to break Israeli positions near Tel Saki and the Tapline Road, where control of the high ground offered a path to the Israeli interior.

 

Tank crews fought at close range, often under shellfire from multiple directions.

 

Israeli supply convoys continued to try to reach forward units at night in spite of constant fire because ammunition supplies had run very low and fuel shortages had forced some tanks to stay in place.

 

At Tel Saki, a small group of IDF paratroopers held out for days in an isolated bunker until they were relieved.

By 7 October, the situation had become more critical, as Israeli forward units held their positions under continuous attack while Syrian commanders brought fresh battalions to the front.

 

Infantry equipped with RPGs and Sagger anti-tank missiles attempted to break through by targeting isolated tanks from elevated terrain or ravines.

 

Meanwhile Israeli air support, whichw as initially limited by Syrian air defences, began to strike supply lines and artillery emplacements.

 

SA-6 "Gainful" missile batteries, however, created a dense anti-aircraft shield that forced Israeli pilots to fly low and accept serious risk during each sortie.


Tel Hermonit observation

Later that day, Tel Hermonit became the focus of the Syrian offensive. From this elevation, Israeli observers could watch and direct fire over the entire Valley of Tears.

 

Tank crews were now operating with limited sleep and minimal supplies, but fought from entrenched positions while tracking several incoming threats.

 

Each crew member rotated duties, sleeping only between artillery strikes or during brief lulls in the fighting.

 

Major General Yitzhak Hofi, who was commander of Israel’s Northern Command, coordinated the defence from headquarters and attempted to direct reinforcements to Ben-Gal’s isolated brigade.

Soldiers from the 188th Armoured Brigade had already fought in the southern sector or had been pulled directly from civilian life and filled defensive gaps and helped restore the perimeter as some Israeli reserve forces began to arrive by 9 October.

 

They entered the battle in small groups, often moving directly from transport trucks into tanks abandoned by earlier crews.

 

Israeli artillery batteries maintained a constant rate of fire, routinely used pre-set targeting data to disrupt Syrian infantry concentrations and to slow their reinforcement routes toward the ridge.


Zvika Greengold's actions

During the same period, one of the most extraordinary individual efforts of the war took place.

 

Lieutenant Zvika Greengold, who had arrived at the front alone and without a tank and had taken control of disabled vehicles, moved between tanks under fire, manned vehicles with available personnel, and destroyed at least twenty Syrian tanks across multiple engagements.

 

His actions were isolated and directly helped prevent several Syrian breakthroughs that would have compromised the Israeli position entirely.

 

For his actions, Greengold was later awarded the Medal of Valor, Israel’s highest military honour.

By 10 October, the Syrian army launched its largest and most continuous effort to take the ridge.

 

Israeli tank units, though battered and in many cases reduced to skeleton crews, held firm and destroyed Syrian tanks at point-blank range because more than 100 tanks had advanced in a broad formation, supported by artillery and infantry fire teams.

 

Each engagement became a test of endurance, with individual tank commanders required to make very quick decisions under constant fire and in worsening battlefield conditions.


Israeli counterattack and the Syrian withdrawal

At dawn on 11 October, the Israeli counterattack began when the 7th Armoured Brigade and elements of the 188th Brigade moved forward to retake positions lost in the earlier fighting .

 

They had been reinforced by more organised reserve units and had been equipped with fresh ammunition and fuel.

 

Israeli artillery and air support interrupted Syrian withdrawal routes, while armoured columns pushed back across the ridge to drive out the remaining enemy forces.

 

Many of the Syrian tanks and vehicles had already been abandoned, either due to damage or lack of fuel, and the retreat became a chaotic withdrawal as Syrian commanders ordered a full pullback behind the Purple Line. 

 

By the end of the battle, the Valley of Tears was a field of destroyed tanks and vehicles.

 

Over 260 Syrian tanks were reported destroyed, and hundreds of soldiers from both sides had been killed or wounded.

 

Israeli forces had held the line at heavy cost, ultimately losing at least 70 tanks and suffering dozens of casualties among their armoured brigades.

 

During the Golan campaign, total Israeli casualties reached approximately 2,700, according to post-war IDF estimates, a figure that covered deaths and wounded personnel as well as those classified as missing.

Eventually, the significance of the battle became clear as Israeli tank crews, many of whom had fought continuously for six days without proper rest or reinforcements, had held the strategic high ground and kept control over northern Israel.

 

Syrian commanders, with superior numbers and initial success, failed to achieve their objective.

 

The Golan Heights remained in Israeli hands, and the Israeli Defence Forces had effectively secured time to regroup and prepare counterattacks on both northern and southern fronts.

 

A United Nations-ordered ceasefire followed on 22 October with Security Council Resolution 338.