Why the Spartacist uprising failed in Germany

Black and white photo of a massive armed crowd marching through a city street during an early 20th century uprising or protest.
Armed workers during the Spartacist uprising, 5 January 1919. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Armed_workers_during_the_Spartacist_uprising,_5_January_1919.jpg

On 5 January 1919, barely two months after the German Kaiser had abdicated and fled to the Netherlands, armed workers and radical socialists occupied newspaper offices across Berlin in a desperate attempt to overthrow the new provisional government.

 

Over the following week, street fighting between revolutionary insurgents and government-backed paramilitaries left between 150 and 200 people dead, and the uprising’s two most prominent leaders were captured and murdered in cold blood.

 

Known as the Spartacist Uprising, this brief and violent episode exposed the fractures within Germany’s post-war left and set a brutal precedent for how the new Weimar Republic would deal with revolutionary threats.

Germany after the Kaiser

By November 1918, Germany was a nation in crisis. Four years of war had devastated the economy, food shortages had pushed civilians to the brink of starvation, and a naval mutiny at Kiel on 29 October had triggered revolutionary unrest across German cities.

 

On 9 November, Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated, and the Social Democrat Friedrich Ebert reluctantly assumed power as head of a provisional government called the Council of the People’s Deputies.

 

Ebert’s government was a fragile coalition between his own Majority Social Democratic Party (MSPD), which favoured parliamentary democracy, and the more radical Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD), which wanted to establish a socialist council republic modelled on Soviet Russia.

 

The USPD left the coalition in late December 1918 after regular troops attacked the People’s Navy Division at the Berlin Palace on Ebert’s orders.

 

From that point, the provisional government had lost its left-wing partners and was increasingly reliant on the old military establishment.


Who were the Spartacists?

At the centre of Germany’s radical left were Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, two figures who had broken with the mainstream Social Democrats over the question of the war.

 

In 1914, Liebknecht became the only member of the Reichstag to vote against war credits, and together with Luxemburg, he founded the International Group, which later became the Spartacus League (Spartakusbund).

 

Named after the Roman slave rebel Spartacus, the group published illegal pamphlets opposing the war and calling for working-class solidarity.

 

After the November Revolution, Luxemburg was released from prison and immediately returned to Berlin, where she and Liebknecht took over the editorship of the Spartacist newspaper Die Rote Fahne (The Red Flag).

 

On 1 January 1919, the Spartacus League merged with other radical groups to form the Communist Party of Germany (KPD).

 

Luxemburg articulated the new party’s programme clearly: the overthrow of the Ebert government and the transfer of all political power to workers’ and soldiers’ councils.

 

The KPD, however, also voted to boycott the upcoming elections for a national assembly, a decision that isolated the party from the general electorate at a critical moment.


Why did Berlin erupt in January 1919?

On 4 January 1919, the Ebert government dismissed Emil Eichhorn, the popular and radical police chief of Berlin, who belonged to the USPD.

 

Eichhorn had refused to use police force against left-wing demonstrators during the upheavals of late 1918, and the government viewed him as a threat to public order.

 

His sacking provoked an immediate and furious response, as the USPD and the KPD joined forces with the Revolutionary Shop Stewards to call for a mass demonstration on 5 January.

 

The turnout far exceeded expectations. Roughly 500,000 workers flooded the streets of Berlin, and armed groups began occupying key buildings, including the offices of the SPD’s own newspaper Vorwärts.

 

A Revolutionary Committee was hastily formed, with Liebknecht among its members, to coordinate what was rapidly becoming an insurrection.

 

Luxemburg believed the uprising was premature, but once events were in motion, she felt that abandoning the workers on the streets would be a worse mistake than joining them.


How the government crushed the revolt

Friedrich Ebert’s ability to suppress the uprising depended on a secret arrangement he had made weeks earlier.

 

On 10 November 1918, Ebert had telephoned General Wilhelm Groener, the Quartermaster General of the German Army, and struck a deal: the military would support the new government against revolutionary threats, and in return, the government would preserve the army’s officer corps and its independence.

 

Known as the Ebert-Groener Pact, this agreement gave Ebert access to military force that was entirely hostile to the revolutionary left.

 

Since the regular army was too weakened and demoralised to be fully relied upon, the government turned to the Freikorps, paramilitary units made up of demobilised soldiers who had kept their weapons after the war.

 

Gustav Noske, the MSPD politician who had taken charge of military affairs, assumed personal responsibility for deploying these units.

 

He reportedly declared, “Someone must be the bloodhound. I will not shirk the responsibility.”

 

By 12 January 1919, Freikorps units had retaken the occupied buildings and crushed the remaining resistance in Berlin with overwhelming force.

 

The uprising had collapsed, and the Revolutionary Committee dissolved.


The murder of Luxemburg and Liebknecht

After the uprising’s defeat, Luxemburg and Liebknecht went into hiding, knowing that their lives were in danger.

 

Right-wing leaflets had been circulating in Berlin for weeks, calling on citizens to “strike their leaders dead” and offering substantial rewards for information on their whereabouts.

 

The SPD newspaper Vorwärts even published a poem on 13 January that openly called for the assassination of the two communist leaders.

 

On the evening of 15 January, both were discovered in an apartment in the Wilmersdorf district of Berlin and arrested by a citizens’ militia.

 

They were handed over to the Guards Cavalry Rifle Division, a Freikorps unit commanded by Captain Waldemar Pabst, and taken to the division’s headquarters at the Hotel Eden.

 

There, both prisoners were beaten with rifle butts by a soldier named Otto Runge.

 

Liebknecht was driven to the Tiergarten park and shot, with his captors later claiming he had been shot during an escape attempt.

 

Luxemburg was shot in the head by officer Hermann Souchon, and her body was dumped in the Landwehr Canal, where it was not recovered until 31 May 1919.

 

Pabst later confirmed that he had received approval from Noske before carrying out the killings.


What the uprising meant for the Weimar Republic

The Spartacist Uprising failed to overthrow the government, and in strictly military terms, it was never likely to succeed.

 

Historian Heinrich August Winkler described it as an “attempted coup by a radical minority,” and mass support for a communist revolution simply did not exist among most German workers in January 1919.

 

Elections for the National Assembly proceeded on 19 January, just four days after the murders, and the assembly went on to draft the Weimar Constitution.

 

The consequences of the uprising ran deeper than the immediate military outcome.

 

The government’s willingness to use Freikorps violence against the left created a pattern that would recur throughout the early Weimar years, and many Freikorps members later joined far-right movements, including the Nazi Party.

 

The killing of Luxemburg and Liebknecht deprived the KPD of its most capable leaders at a formative moment, and the bitterness between Social Democrats and Communists over the murders poisoned relations between the two parties for the republic’s entire duration.

 

When the Nazis rose to power in the early 1930s, that division made a united left-wing opposition all but impossible.