Understanding the history of the Palestine Liberation Organization

At a summit held in Cairo on May 28, 1964, Arab heads of state agreed to create the Palestine Liberation Organization.

They intended it to be a joint response to growing Palestinian unrest and a way to limit interference from other countries in future Palestinian activities.

The newly created Palestinian National Council (PNC) met for the first time in East Jerusalem when it was under Jordanian control and adopted a national charter that declared all of Palestine to be Arab land and called for its full liberation through armed struggle.

Initially, the Arab League had largely controlled the PLO's direction, and the organisation had largely been a public voice for Arab governments rather than an independent institution.

The PLO’s original structure included an Executive Committee, the PNC, and the Palestine Liberation Army as its military wing.

Although the PLA was officially under PLO authority, it had been largely controlled in practice by Arab states such as Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. 

At the same time, Egypt had influenced the organisation’s early structure, as President Gamal Abdel Nasser had wanted to position Egypt as the leader of the Arab world and had supported the appointment of Ahmad Shukeiri as the first PLO chairman.

Shukeiri had previously worked as a Saudi representative at the United Nations and shared the League’s political goals.

As a result, the PLO's military wing, the Palestine Liberation Army, operated under the command of Arab states rather than answering to a unified Palestinian authority.

Egyptian support meant the PLO would not challenge Cairo’s leadership. 

Eventually, this arrangement began to change. By 1969, after internal shifts and pressure from grassroots Palestinian factions, Yasser Arafat had become chairman of the PLO Executive Committee as leader of Fatah.

His rise began a new phase since, under Arafat, the PLO claimed independence from Arab capitals and restructured itself as a wider coalition of Palestinian groups.

He had built up the organisation’s internal authority and had focused its strategy mainly on military operations and international diplomacy. 

From its inception, the PLO called for the return of all Palestinian refugees and the removal of the Israeli state.

Its vision for the future involved replacing Israel with a single, secular Palestinian state but, to achieve this, it insisted that armed resistance was justified and necessary.

The 1968 Palestinian National Charter stated that Zionism was a colonial movement that had no legal or historical legitimacy, declaring, "The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national duty." 

Over time, the PLO also expanded its political aims, and it hoped to unify Palestinians among Palestinians living abroad, in the occupied territories, and in refugee camps, while also promoting a shared sense of national identity.

To accomplish this, the PLO operated educational and medical services and conducted information campaigns within refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.

In Lebanon, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society was established in 1968 and was led by Fathi Arafat, Yasser Arafat’s brother, and it provided healthcare to roughly tens of thousands.

These operations not only provided basic services but also strengthened the PLO’s influence among the population it claimed to speak for. 

At the international level, the organisation pursued diplomatic recognition. It built relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc countries, and non-aligned states across Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

It worked gradually, step by step, to change how the world saw the conflict from a regional dispute to a colonial struggle for liberation, as by November 22, 1974, the PLO had gained observer status at the United Nations through General Assembly Resolution 3237.

That same year, Yasser Arafat addressed the General Assembly, declaring, "I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand."

The Arab League and other international bodies formally recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the PLO became the primary actor in armed confrontations with Israel.

Following its expulsion from Jordan in 1970 during the Black September conflict, in which an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 Palestinians were killed and tens of thousands displaced, the PLO had relocated to Lebanon and had begun to launch cross-border attacks into northern Israel.

From bases in southern Lebanon and within Palestinian refugee camps, its fighters carried out guerrilla raids, rocket attacks, and sabotage missions.

These actions triggered repeated Israeli military responses and eventually led to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, known as Operation Peace for Galilee. 

After Israeli forces surrounded Beirut, a deal negotiated by international mediators had forced Arafat and his fighters to evacuate to Tunisia, as from there, the PLO had operated in exile and had continued to manage a largely dispersed network of diplomatic operations and of military and propaganda activities.

During its years in Lebanon, the organisation also became entangled in the wider Lebanese Civil War.

As a result, it lost support among segments of the local population and became a target of Lebanese Christian militias.

The 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre, which caused the killing of an estimated 800 to over 3,000 Palestinian refugees by Phalangist militias and showed the vulnerability of the PLO’s civilian communities and caused global outrage.

The Kahan Commission later found Israel indirectly responsible for allowing the massacre to occur, and Defence Minister Ariel Sharon was forced to resign. 

Soon after, the uprising within the occupied territories shifted attention back to Palestinians who lived under Israeli control.

The First Intifada began in 1987 as a localised protest movement against military occupation, curfews, arrests, and economic restrictions.

Initially, the PLO had little control over events on the ground. However, it soon adapted and offered political support to the uprising, which helped consolidate its authority among Palestinians who lived under occupation.

The Intifada changed how people around the world saw the issue by revealing the ongoing effects of Israel’s military presence in Gaza and the West Bank. 

By the late 1980s, the PLO’s leadership began to reconsider its strategies. On November 15, 1988, during a meeting of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers, it declared the creation of an independent State of Palestine, as that same declaration referred to United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, which implied recognition of Israel’s existence within pre-1967 borders.

This shift opened the door to talks with the United States and led to more formal peace efforts. 

In 1993, secret negotiations in Norway led to the signing of the Oslo I Accord, as under this agreement, the PLO officially recognised the State of Israel and renounced terrorism, while Israel recognised the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Both sides agreed to a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority to govern those areas.

Mahmoud Abbas held a senior PLO position and helped negotiate the agreement.

The handshake between Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn symbolised a major turning point. 

Later agreements, including Oslo II in 1995 and the Hebron Protocol in 1997, expanded Palestinian self-rule but left many final-status issues unresolved.

These included the status of Jerusalem, the right of return for refugees, and the future of Israeli settlements.

Many Palestinians grew frustrated as their daily lives showed little improvement and they continued to live under military occupation.

The 2000 Camp David Summit, which failed to reach a final agreement, contributed to growing tension.

A subsequent visit by Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount in September 2000 triggered the eruption of the Second Intifada.

Violence surged and trust eroded on both sides. 

Still, the PLO continued to take part in international efforts. In 2002, it supported the Arab Peace Initiative, which offered full normalisation of relations between Arab states and Israel in return for a complete withdrawal from occupied territories and a just solution for refugees.

In 2003, it accepted the Road Map for Peace, proposed by the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia.

Continued negotiations produced few concrete results. Israeli military operations such as Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 further weakened Palestinian institutions. 

From the outset, the PLO’s reliance on armed struggle and guerrilla warfare attracted international criticism.

During the 1970s, factions linked to the PLO, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Black September, carried out plane hijackings, hostage-takings, and assassinations that killed civilians.

Among the most infamous incidents was the attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics, where Black September gunmen murdered eleven Israeli athletes and coaches.

The PLO denied direct involvement, and its refusal to disavow the attack caused diplomatic consequences and reinforced its image as a sponsor of terrorism.

Israel responded with Operation Wrath of God, a secret campaign that targeted individuals believed to be responsible, though some of the operations mistakenly killed innocent people. 

Domestically, its leadership also faced growing criticism. As the Palestinian Authority began to govern parts of the West Bank and Gaza after 1994, complaints about corruption and mismanagement and the lack of clear accountability grew louder.

Accusations targeted Yasser Arafat’s inner circle, which controlled foreign aid, security forces, and media institutions without effective oversight.

Reports from international organisations that included Transparency International reported growing concerns.

Many Palestinians became disillusioned with the slow pace of change and the perceived failure to secure a viable path to statehood. 

After the 2006 legislative elections, a political crisis unfolded because Hamas had gained popularity through its social services and refusal to compromise with Israel and defeated Fatah and took control of Gaza after violent clashes.

The PLO had largely continued to be dominated by Fatah and had retained power in the West Bank but had lost influence in Gaza.

The 2007 Mecca Agreement attempted but failed to resolve the rift, as this split weakened its claim to speak for all Palestinians and deepened internal divisions that persist today. 

Even so, the PLO continued to be the primary channel for Palestinian diplomatic engagement.

In 2012, under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas, it secured non-member observer state status for Palestine at the United Nations by a vote of 138 in favour, 9 against, and 41 abstentions.

This symbolic step affirmed international recognition of Palestinian national claims, but it did not lead to substantial political change and the PLO continued to act as the historical core of the Palestinian national movement.

It developed through decades of exile and through phases in which resistance moved into negotiation and state-building efforts.