How Napoleon won the Battle of the Pyramids in 1798

In 1798, in the middle of the French Revolutionary Wars, France was still at war with Great Britain, and a direct invasion of Britain seemed impractical.

So, instead, the French Directory approved Napoleon’s plan to strike at British interests by seizing Egypt.

If he was able to take control of Egypt, it promised to threaten Britain’s vital trade routes to India and the East, while also expanding French influence in the Middle East.

Although Egypt was officially part of the Ottoman Empire, it was ruled by the semi-autonomous Mamluk elite; Napoleon assumed the Ottomans might tolerate a French takeover since the Mamluks paid only nominal homage to Istanbul.  

After departing Toulon in May 1798 and capturing the island of Malta en route, about 36,000 French troops landed in Egypt in July, took Alexandria on 2 July, and marched toward Cairo.

Alongside his army, Napoleon had brought scholars and scientists, aiming to establish a French administrative presence and to civilize (at least in French eyes) the region.

This was clearly indicated in his proclamation that France came to liberate Egyptians from Mamluk ‘slavery’. 

Despite Napoleon’s grand ambitions, the campaign faced immediate challenges.

The march from Alexandria to Cairo was grueling: French troops, clad in heavy wool uniforms, suffered from intense desert heat, thirst, and constant harassment by local Bedouins.

Many became ill, and discipline gradually faltered during the harsh trek. However, morale lifted when the army reached the Nile on 10 July, and on 13 July Napoleon won a minor engagement against Murad Bey’s forces at Shubra Khit (Chobrakit).

This preliminary skirmish gave the French a taste of Mamluk tactics. By 21 July, after marching overnight, Napoleon’s army finally encountered the Mamluk host a few miles north of Cairo, and about 15 km (9 miles) from Giza pyramids.  

Napoleon’s Army of the Orient in Egypt numbered roughly 25,000 men, and was organized into five divisions under experienced the generals Desaix, Reynier, Dugua, Vial, and Bon.

The French infantry were battle-hardened from campaigns in Europe and formed into demi-brigades, which was the Revolutionary term for regiments.

They were equipped with muskets and bayonets, and supported by field artillery, including howitzers, that Napoleon had brought along on flatboats up the Nile.

However, French cavalry was relatively scarce and only numbered about 3,000 troopers.

This is because many horses had died during the sea voyage or march. The chief strengths of the French force were its discipline and cohesion.

They had standardized training and fought in coordinated formations, which gave them a significant advantage over the ad-hoc feudal levies of the enemy.

On the other hand, the French were on foreign soil and were cut off from France’s support by the large distances.

They had been marching all night before the battle and were fatigued from the desert conditions.

So, they had to win decisively on land to secure local resources. 

Opposing the French was the military of Ottoman Egypt, which was focused around the Mamluks.

The Mamluk army was led by Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey, who were the effective rulers of Egypt under nominal Ottoman sovereignty.

Murad Bey had drawn up his forces on the west bank of the Nile near the village of Embabeh (also spelled Imbaba or Embabeh).

Across the Nile on the east bank stood Ibrahim Bey with a second contingent.

They were divided in this way because the eastern force had been unable to cross in time. 

The main core of the Egyptian army was the formidable Mamluk cavalry, which was around 6,000 heavily armored horsemen.

These Mamluk cavalrymen were elite slave-soldiers, often of Georgian or Circassian origin, who were raised from childhood to ride and fight.

They were superb individual fighters. In fact, contemporary accounts describe their splendid horses and the riders’ formidable arsenal of weapons.

Each warrior carried muskets, pairs of pistols, multiple spears or javelins, sabers, maces, and daggers, and often wielded these in quick succession during a charge.

In battle, a Mamluk would discharge his firearms and then close in with edged weapons, seeking glory in single combat.

Many wore elaborate silk garments and even carried their wealth into battle by wearing gold and jewels sewn into their clothing.

Murad’s forces also included some artillery and infantry of much poorer quality.

Perhaps 40 cannon were positioned around Embabeh, though many were antiquated and mounted on fixed carriages that limited their mobility.

The bulk of the infantry were local peasant conscripts known as fellahin and other levies, possibly 15,000–20,000 or more, armed with pikes, clubs, or outdated muskets.

These peasant infantry were ill-trained and, often, reluctant fighters. Ultimately, the Mamluk strengths lay in their heavy cavalry’s courage and shock power but lacked modern organization.

They had no cohesive infantry tactics to support the cavalry and relied almost exclusively on frontal cavalry charges to decide battles. 

Napoleon’s larger strategy in Egypt was to defeat the Mamluk military elite swiftly, expecting that the rest of the population would submit once its rulers were toppled.

He wrote, “To destroy England truly, we shall have to capture Egypt”. Tactically, Napoleon knew from both intelligence and the July 13 skirmish at Shubra Khit that the Mamluks would rely on massive cavalry charges.

To negate this, he introduced a significant military innovation on the battlefield: the use of large divisional squares.

These were hollow rectangular formations that would protect his forces from all sides.

Each French division of approximately 5,000 men were trained to form a rectangle several ranks deep.

Cavalry, baggage, and reserve units were placed inside the square, while the outer ranks bristled with bayonets and muskets, as well as being supported by field cannon at the corners of each square.

This formation meant that charging horsemen would face musket fire and grapeshot from multiple angles, and even if they rode around a square, they could not find an exposed flank.

Napoleon drilled his troops to hold steady, as any gap could be fatal. Discipline was key, and every French soldier knew that breaking formation to flee would not only be dishonorable but also deadly, as a lone runner would be cut down by swift Mamluk horsemen. 

The Mamluk commanders, for their part, planned to utilize their cavalry’s shock and the prepared defenses of Embabeh.

Murad Bey positioned infantry and cannons in the fortified village on his right by the Nile and at another village, named Biktil, on his left, intending to protect his flanks.

Meanwhile, his Mamluk cavalry massed in the center. Murad’s hope was to let the French wear themselves out against these fortified flanks and then launch his cavalry at the weakened French center.  

On the day of battle, Napoleon could see the enemy banners and the pyramids beyond as his exhausted troops arrived around midday.

He allowed his men a brief one-hour rest in the oppressive afternoon heat, then ordered preparations for battle by about 3:00 p.m.

In Napoleon’s own pre-battle words to his troops, he said, “From the top of those pyramids, forty centuries are contemplating you”.

The French formed up in five massive squares on an oblique line anchored by the Nile on the left flank.

From right, 'desert flank', to left, 'river flank', the divisions were arrayed as follows: Desaix on the far right, then Reynier, Dugua, Vial, and Bon nearest the Nile.

Napoleon and his staff took position inside the central square, which was Dugua’s, where he could observe and direct the action with protection on all sides.

Meanwhile, Murad Bey deployed roughly 6,000 Mamluk cavalry in the center of his line. 

As the French divisions edged forward, Murad Bey decided to strike first. Around 3:30 p.m., he unleashed a mass cavalry charge without waiting for the French to come closer.

Hundreds of Mamluk horsemen, with bright silk garments fluttering and war cries in the air, thundered across the sands towards the French right flank, which was closest to the open desert.

Desaix’s and Reynier’s divisions on the right bore the brunt of this assault. The French infantry immediately halted and formed their square formations.

French field artillery at the corners of the squares opened fire with grapeshot and tore gaps in the charging ranks at a distance.

Crucially, the French musketry held fire until the Mamluks were almost point-blank.

According to an eyewitness, Lieutenant Vetray, “The soldiers fired with such coolness that not a single cartridge was wasted, waiting until the last minute when the horsemen were about to break our square. The number of corpses surrounding our square soon was considerable”.

The effect was devastating: horses and riders went down in heaps just yards from the French line, and the fine clothes of fallen Mamluks caught fire from the muzzle blasts.

Some extraordinarily brave, or desperate, Mamluk riders did manage to reach the French line, only to be stabbed by bayonets or shot at point-blank range.

None of the squares were broken and the first great charge had failed. Still, the Mamluks were famed for their tenacity.

In small groups or individually, they renewed the cavalry attacks repeatedly, circling and probing the French formations for any sign of weakness.

For perhaps an hour, waves of Mamluk horsemen charged again and again, but each attempt was repelled by disciplined volleys from the French squares. 

While the elite Mamluk cavalry was locked in these fruitless charges on the French right and front, Napoleon saw an opportunity on the enemy’s flank.

He ordered his leftmost divisions, under Generals Bon and Vial near the Nile, to assault the fortified village of Embabeh where the Mamluk infantry and guns were stationed.

Supported by a flotilla of French gunboats on the Nile that Napoleon had positioned to harass the riverbank, Bon’s and Vial’s infantry formed attack columns and stormed Embabeh.

The village’s defenders, many of whom were peasants, fired a few volleys and cannon shots, but their antiquated guns on static mounts could not be trained effectively on the advancing French.

French troops rushed into Embabeh’s streets and, after fierce fighting, the tricolor was raised over the village as the Egyptian garrison broke and fled.

To prevent any escape, a French demi-brigade swung behind Embabeh, cutting off the retreat route from the village to Cairo.

This trapped Murad’s army between the French infantry squares to their front and the captured village to their rear. 

With Embabeh fallen, Murad Bey’s position became untenable. Many of the surviving Mamluk cavalry, once seeing their path of retreat blocked and their infantry in disarray, panicked and a general rout ensued.

Murad himself had been wounded by a saber cut to the cheek and barely escaped the field, galloping off with a few hundred of his cavalry toward Giza and then into Upper Egypt’s hinterlands.

The remainder of the Egyptian forces on the west bank now fled toward the Nile.

Some attempted to reach the bridge of boats to Bulaq, Cairo’s port suburb, or any ford to join Ibrahim Bey’s contingent across the river.

In the chaos, hundreds of men, and even horses, plunged into the Nile trying to swim to safety under French musket fire.

This proved tragic, as many drowned in the strong currents. One contemporary report claims as many as 1,000 drowned, while others were shot or cut down near the shore.

As well, French sailors in the gunboats used oars to club at escaping enemies in the water.

By around 5 p.m., the Battle of the Pyramids was effectively over. In the span of only about an hour or two of combat, Napoleon had won a lopsided victory.

French casualties were remarkably light. Napoleon’s official report claimed only 29 killed and about 120 wounded, with surgeon Dominique Larrey later estimating roughly 260 total French wounded.

On the Egyptian side, the losses were catastrophic. An estimated 1,500–2,000 Mamluk cavalry were killed in the fighting and thousands of the fellahin infantry and camp followers were dead or wounded.

Some sources put total Egyptian casualties as high as 10,000 including those drowned, though exact numbers are uncertain.

In any case, Murad Bey’s proud army had been virtually destroyed as a fighting force. 

On the east bank of the Nile, Ibrahim Bey had witnessed the disaster befalling Murad’s forces.

One legend says that a sudden dust storm obscured his view at a critical moment, which delayed any attempt to ferry his troops across the river.

Once it was clear that Murad was defeated, Ibrahim Bey chose to abandon Cairo rather than risk the same fate.

That night, the July 21st-22nd, he led his retainers and remaining Mamluks out of the city toward the Sinai desert and Syria.

Cairo was then left largely defenseless. In the aftermath of the battle, the French were amazed at the riches found on the field.

They stripped the bodies of Mamluk nobles, recovering money, jewels, and fine weapons.

One French officer claimed to have found 200 to 300 gold pieces on one body alone. 

On July 22, the city’s leading citizens of Cairo, including the Ottoman governor, local sheikhs, and notables, rode out to meet Napoleon and officially surrendered the capital city to the French without further resistance.

Two days later, on the 24th July 1798, General Bonaparte made a formal entrance into Cairo at the head of his army.

Napoleon then allowed his troops to enjoy the fruits of victory. Soldiers were given relative freedom to roam the markets, attend festive entertainments, and even visit the pyramids as tourists.

The Battle of the Pyramids had ended in a complete French triumph. As a result, centuries of Mamluk military control in Egypt were abruptly ended in a single afternoon. 

Napoleon set up a French administration in Cairo. He tried to collaborate with local elites by forming a diwan, or council of notable Egyptians at which he promised to respect local customs and religion.

However, revolts soon broke out: most notably the Cairo uprising in October 1798, which Napoleon crushed with brutal force, which included bombardment of the Al-Azhar Mosque area.

The Battle of the Pyramids was a wake-up call to the Muslim world. As one Ottoman observer noted, the crushing defeat of the famed Mamluk cavalry clearly demonstrated the need to modernize armies along European lines.

So, over the subsequent decades, both the Ottomans reformed their forces, adopting European drill, firearms, and tactics to avoid the fate the Mamluks suffered. 

For Napoleon and France, the Battle of the Pyramids initially appeared as a brilliant strategic and propaganda success.

In the short term, news of the victory, when it eventually reached Paris, strengthened Napoleon’s fame as a military genius.

Bonaparte carefully crafted the military reports to glorify the win. Even the name ‘Battle of the Pyramids’, which would have only been visible on the horizon of the battlefield, was chosen to sound more impressive.

The victory provided a much-needed boost to French morale amid the ongoing war, and Napoleon portrayed himself as the liberator of Egypt and champion of French interests in the East.

However, the euphoria was short-lived. Just 10 days after the battle, Admiral Horatio Nelson’s British fleet annihilated the French navy at the Battle of the Nile on 1 August 1798.

This devastating naval defeat stranded Napoleon’s army in Egypt without hope of reinforcement or easy resupply.

It turned the strategic situation on its head. No matter how victorious the French were on land, the loss of sea control meant France could not easily capitalize on the conquest.  

Over the subsequent year, Napoleon’s army struggled with isolation, disease, and mounting resistance.

Napoleon himself, sensing the campaign’s dimming prospects and opportunities beckoning in France, abandoned his army in August 1799 and sailed back to France with a small entourage.

In France, Napoleon’s departure was controversial but his timing was impeccable.

He arrived in Paris before the true extent of the Egyptian fiasco was widely known, and he leveraged his celebrity from battles like the Pyramids to launch a political coup.

In November 1799, he seized power in France as First Consul. Meanwhile, the army he left behind in Egypt, under General Kléber and later General Menou, fought on.

They won a few battles, such as defeating an Ottoman landing at Abukir in 1799, but ultimately, cut off from support, they surrendered to British-Ottoman forces in 1801, as part of an evacuation deal.

In the long term, the Battle of the Pyramids became an iconic part of Napoleonic legend.

French artists Gros, Lejeune, and others, painted the battle lavishly, and it was cited as proof of Napoleon’s tactical brilliance.

Politically, however, France’s ambitions in the Middle East were set back.

Ultimately, while Napoleon personally profited from the glory of the Battle of the Pyramids, France ultimately saw its Egyptian expedition collapse and had to focus again on the wars closer to home.