Sulla's reign of terror: The bloody proscriptions that legalized murder in ancient Rome

Lucius Cornelius Sulla was born around 138 BCE and belonged to an old patrician family, but his early life lacked the financial advantages that usually helped aristocrats rise through the ranks of Roman society.

Although he lived in modest conditions, he studied literature and Greek philosophy during his youth and later pursued formal instruction in law so that he possessed the education expected of a Roman noble.

His military career began during the Jugurthine War in North Africa, where he served under Gaius Marius and gained recognition for negotiating the surrender of King Jugurtha with the aid of Bocchus of Mauretania.

After his success in Numidia, Sulla continued to win victories during the Social War, where he commanded Roman forces against rebellious Italian allies and earned a triumph for his leadership.

In 88 BCE, he secured the consulship and received command of the war against Mithridates VI of Pontus.

However, the populares faction in Rome, led by Marius and Sulpicius Rufus, used the popular assemblies to strip Sulla of his command and hand it to Marius instead.

In response, Sulla broke a foundational taboo by marching his army into Rome, forcing the populares into exile and reclaiming his authority by force. 

Following his victory in the East, Sulla returned to Italy in 83 BCE and launched a campaign against the Marian forces, which included Marius’ son and several senior senators.

After a brutal series of battles, including the decisive clash at the Colline Gate, Sulla entered Rome again and declared himself dictator for an unlimited term rather than the traditional six-month period.

This unusual appointment, made legal by the passage of the Lex Valeria, allowed him to rule by decree and carry out his plans for political reform and organised revenge.

He celebrated a triumph for his victories in the East, likely in 83 BCE, further legitimising his control of the state before initiating his dictatorship and reforms. 

During the final decades of the second century BCE, political rivalries in Rome deepened into open warfare between the optimates, who supported senatorial authority, and the populares, who promoted reforms through the assemblies and the tribunate.

As pressure grew from landless citizens, Italian allies, and senior commanders, traditional methods of compromise gave way to violent conflict and personal vendettas.

The deaths of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, who had attempted to reform land laws and extend citizenship in 133 BCE and 123–121 BCE respectively, had already set a precedent for the use of force in political disputes.

Gaius Marius, once Sulla’s commander, gained popular support through his military victories and reforms, but his rivalry with Sulla became a bitter struggle for control of the state.

When Marius seized power during Sulla’s absence in the East, his supporters killed many of Sulla’s allies and passed laws targeting the Senate. 

Sulla believed that the Republic had fallen under the control of dangerous demagogues who used mob violence and legal manipulation to destroy the authority of the aristocracy.

By presenting himself as a defender of traditional order, he justified his extreme methods as necessary for restoring stability.

The Senate, weakened by years of division and violence, granted him extraordinary powers without serious resistance, allowing him to assume the dictatorship and act without legal constraints.

Contemporary observers such as Sallust and Plutarch described a loss of morals in Roman politics and noted that fear and personal gain replaced principled leadership. 

Sulla introduced the proscriptions shortly after securing control of Rome, publishing a list of names in the Forum that identified those considered enemies of the state.

Anyone listed could be killed on sight, and their property would be seized by the state.

Rewards were offered to informants and assassins, while the heirs of the victims were disinherited and banned from holding office.

As new names were added and reposted, the lists became a daily source of terror. 

Public execution became a regular feature of life in the capital, and soldiers carried out beheadings in full view of the population.

The heads of victims were nailed to the Rostra in the Forum, where they served as both trophies and warnings.

Appian described the scene in graphic detail and explained how the display of familiar faces as trophies made the public indifferent.

The lists grew longer each day, and citizens began to fear the consequences of speaking out or harbouring fugitives.

Some names appeared on the list not for political reasons but because of wealth, property, or personal disputes. 

The confiscated estates were auctioned by the state, and Sulla’s supporters used the chaos to enrich themselves.

Marcus Licinius Crassus, who later became one of Rome’s wealthiest men, made his fortune by buying these properties at bargain prices.

Sulla’s freedman, Lucius Cornelius Chrysogonus, became well known for acquiring large estates at minimal cost.

Others used the proscriptions to eliminate rivals, claim inheritances, or remove debtors.

Sulla appointed officials to oversee the process, but corruption and bribery became widespread. 

In the provinces, reports suggest that similar violence occurred under the authority of local commanders, who at times mirrored the Roman proscriptions by targeting local elites.

Although not officially sanctioned in the same manner, these actions allowed governors to establish authority over towns.

Governors extended the proscriptions to local elites and used the opportunity to assert political dominance over the municipalities.

As reports of killings and seizures spread, communities across Italy experienced the same fear and instability that gripped the capital. 

The majority of those proscribed had supported the Marian faction, but the selection process quickly expanded to include any individual who posed a potential threat or possessed desirable property.

Senators, equestrians, former magistrates, and even clients of Sulla’s allies were killed.

Many had not taken an active part in the civil war but were condemned for past associations or perceived disloyalty. 

One of the most notable victims was Quintus Mucius Scaevola, a respected jurist and former consul who had refused to support either faction during the conflict.

He was murdered in a temple, and his death shocked many Romans who still believed in the sanctity of religious spaces.

Another was Lucius Junius Brutus Damasippus, a violent supporter of Marius who had purged the Senate in earlier years.

His execution fulfilled a personal vendetta for Sulla but also sent a clear message about the consequences of previous violence.

Publius Antistius, the father-in-law of Pompey, was another target, executed during this period, possibly as part of the proscriptions, despite his connections.

The relatives of the proscribed were punished as well. Sons lost their inheritance rights and were barred from political life.

Some were later pardoned, but their exclusion created a generation of embittered aristocrats who waited for revenge.

Julius Caesar, whose aunt Julia had been married to Marius, grew up during this period and watched as many of his family members suffered under Sulla’s orders.

Sulla reportedly spared Caesar only after being persuaded by others, saying, "In that boy, there are many Mariuses."

Women connected to the condemned suffered legal and financial ruin, as wives lost their dowries, and daughters could not marry into respectable families.

Social networks collapsed as families were stripped of wealth and status, and the survivors often fled into exile or lived in quiet disgrace.

The legal system, also, once a protection against arbitrary violence, now enabled the destruction of political rivals through officially sanctioned murder. 

Interestingly, the redistribution of property caused severe economic instability. By flooding the market with confiscated estates, the state drove down land prices and disrupted the livelihoods of tenants and freedmen who had lived and worked on the properties.

Many farms were abandoned or mismanaged by new owners who had little experience or interest in agriculture.

Sulla settled thousands of veterans on confiscated land, particularly in Etruria and Campania, where resistance had been strongest.

Ancient sources, including Plutarch, claim he settled as many as 120,000 men, though modern scholars question the accuracy of this figure.

These settlements created deep resentment among the dispossessed and often led to violent clashes between the new colonists and the local population.

Many of the veterans, encouraged by their loyalty to Sulla, acted without restraint and treated the land as a reward rather than a long-term investment. 

The traditional Roman aristocracy also changed, as new men, many of whom had profited from the auctions and gained seats in the Senate through Sulla’s patronage, lacked the ancestral prestige and political training that had defined earlier generations.

The Senate expanded from around 300 to 600 members, but its authority weakened as individual desire for power replaced public service.

As such, confidence in the Republic’s institutions declined as it became clear that violence could elevate a man to supreme power. 

Sulla’s constitutional reforms, which aimed to restore senatorial power and limit the influence of the tribunate, could not compensate for the trauma his dictatorship had inflicted.

The Republic, though still functioning on paper, had suffered a blow that would take decades to recover from. 

In 81 BCE, Sulla declared that the proscriptions had fulfilled their purpose and issued an edict ending the process.

He claimed that the enemies of Rome had been destroyed and that further killings were no longer necessary.

The lists ceased, though isolated executions continued for months. Sulla then resigned the dictatorship and returned to private life without fear of prosecution.

He retired to his villa in Campania and dictated his memoirs, which defended his actions as lawful and necessary.

The Senate had sworn an oath of loyalty to him, and his voluntary resignation shocked many who had expected him to cling to power.

He died in 78 BCE, still convinced that he had restored the Republic to its traditional path.

However, many Romans remembered the proscriptions not as a defence of liberty, but as the first time that state power had been used so openly to legitimise personal revenge and mass murder. 

The memory haunted Roman politics. The idea that legal authority could sanction political killing did not disappear.

In fact, just over three decades later, the Second Triumvirate of Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus would revive the proscriptions on an even larger scale.

The precedent had been set, and Rome would never again return to the limits that had once restrained its political violence.