Alexander the Great’s murderous crossing of the Gedrosian Desert

According to ancient writers, the Gedrosian Desert, today known as the Makran region, approximately covered the southern coastline of what is now Iran and Pakistan.

Its land included cracked salt flats, jagged ridges, dunes that shifted, and large stretches of rock that scorched bare feet and blinded animals with reflected heat.

Daytime temperatures could often reach more than 45 degrees Celsius.

Conditions across the region made travel difficult even for the scattered coastal communities that relied on fishing and seasonal migration. 

Several historical accounts had already warned of its dangers. Herodotus described how Cyrus the Great lost an entire army in a desert during a campaign against Arabs (Histories 1.153), though later writers speculated that this may have referred to the Gedrosian region.

Local inhabitants generally avoided long overland journeys and instead moved between hills and isolated wells.

Because of this, even small caravans relied on detailed preparation, and no major army had tried to pass through since Cyrus's failure. 

Writers such as Arrian, who collected accounts from officers who had survived, described the desert as so hostile that survival often became uncertain.

The rare freshwater springs that occasionally reached the surface could dry without warning.

For this reason, the safest routes clung to the coast, yet even they offered no guarantee of safety. 

After his army had refused to continue past the Hyphasis River in India, Alexander ordered the return to Persian territory.

Instead of selecting the most direct route, he divided his forces to create a demonstration of power and control.

Craterus would lead one group through Arachosia, Nearchus would command the fleet along the coast, and Alexander himself would take the centre directly across Gedrosia. 

Alexander had issued orders to build up supply depots in Carmania and to secure food and water at key points along the route, which he expected would support the crossing.

He had believed that if he coordinated with Nearchus' ships, he could maintain a flow of supplies even during the harshest conditions.

However, rough seas, bad timing, and bad communication prevented the land force from linking with the fleet.

In many cases, when Alexander’s men reached the depots, they found nothing but empty containers or spoiled grain. 

It appears that supply errors and false promises had likely weakened the plan before the crossing began.

But ancient sources described Alexander as fearless and disciplined. There was no clear evidence that he had changed his plans after learning how dangerous the environment was.

Some later writers suggested that he had chosen the route to copy the god Dionysus, whom Greek tradition claimed had once crossed the same region during a mythical eastern campaign.

Because he favoured glory and a show of strength, he probably exposed his men to risks that no previous commander had attempted to overcome. 

As soon as the army had entered the Gedrosian Desert, the consequences became clear, as extremely hot daytime conditions, violent sandstorms, and the total absence of shelter caused immediate losses.

At night, winds that were freezing caused hypothermia in men already weakened from exhaustion and hunger.

The land swallowed entire groups, while horses and camels collapsed from dehydration. 

Scouts who had searched for ancient wells reported that most had likely either dried up or become unreachable.

Local guides who had been promised by regional officials either refused to appear or deliberately gave false directions, but because the army had become dependent on pack animals, the loss of mules and elephants meant that vital supplies could not reach the front.

Modern estimates suggest that the total column may have included between 30,000 and 40,000 people, but some accounts place the figure higher, which included support personnel and non-combatants.

Thousands of animals also accompanied the force. 

Within days, discipline had already begun to break down. Soldiers began to break into storage carts, which sometimes led them to fight each other over single flasks of water and to ignore direct orders.

Panic often spread through the units whenever a rumour circulated about a hidden spring or a village just ahead.

Yet most of those hopes ended in disappointment or death. As physical suffering worsened, even the veterans who had followed Alexander since the campaigns in Asia Minor began to question whether survival was possible. 

Alexander refused to ride while his men marched, so he travelled on foot alongside them and rejected any water unless it could be shared equally.

On one occasion, when scouts presented him with a helmet full of water, he tipped it into the sand rather than drink alone.

Arrian (Anabasis 6.26) preserved this moment as one that briefly restored morale.

Soldiers, it was said, were encouraged by this act and found the strength to continue for a short time. 

To ease pressure on water sources, he divided his forces into smaller units and spread them over multiple paths.

Each group aimed to locate separate wells and meet again at agreed points.

Alexander also led small advance teams to scout for settlements or hidden supplies.

When reports reached him about possible stores near the coast, he sent runners to check the area, who rarely returned with anything useful. 

Even with all of these efforts, the situation continued to worsen. Many men who had fallen behind were probably never seen again, and others who suffered from dysentery or infected wounds died without medical care.

Alexander punished looters and deserters to maintain order, yet by this stage, fear of death outweighed fear of discipline.

Even with his personal leadership, the breakdown of the army’s structure became unavoidable. 

Ancient authors had given different numbers, but all agreed that the loss of life was likely very large.

Some modern historians estimate that only one in four of the original force survived the crossing, though Arrian himself did not provide a specific figure.

According to Curtius Rufus and Plutarch, the march through Gedrosia killed more men than any battle Alexander had ever fought.

The starting column likely included over 60,000 people, which included infantry, cavalry, engineers, slaves and pack handlers.

By the end, probably fewer than half reached Persian territory. 

Thousands of horses, elephants, and camels also died, and with them went the army’s food, armour, and communications equipment.

Much of Alexander’s baggage train, which carried his treasury, official documents, and tribute from India, disappeared into the sands.

As a result, the army arrived in Susa without the ability to fight and too weak to recover quickly. 

Memories of the crossing often troubled those who survived. They told stories of men driven mad by thirst, of hallucinations and suicide, and of entire regiments that vanished without trace.

Some refused to speak of it in later years. After Gedrosia, people no longer saw Alexander as a flawless commander. The cost had likely been too great. 

When Alexander reached Susa in early 324 BCE, he staged ceremonies, handed out rewards, and reorganised the military.

He also arranged the mass weddings between Macedonian officers and Persian noblewomen as part of a wider attempt to promote cultural integration across the empire.

However, beneath the surface, discontent lingered. Many soldiers had lost comrades, suffered permanent injuries, or lost faith in their commander’s judgement.

The traditional bonds between king and army no longer held with the same strength. 

Regardless, Alexander continued to plan future expeditions. He ordered a new fleet to be built and ordered roads and harbours to be built to support a campaign into Arabia.

He believed that if he pressed forward, he could restore the momentum of conquest.

But his generals, who had seen the disaster unfold in Gedrosia, no longer showed the same loyalty or trust. 

At Opis, discontent broke into open rebellion, as Macedonian soldiers demanded the right to return home and refused to serve beside foreign recruits.

Alexander responded with speeches, mass discharges, and symbolic gestures, but the rebellion had already shown the limits of his authority.

The trauma of Gedrosia had broken something essential in the structure of his empire. 

By the following year, Alexander had returned to Babylon, where he died in June 323 BCE.

His death, whether caused by fever, poison, or exhaustion, ended all further plans of conquest.

Some later sources speculated that the damage sustained during the desert crossing may have permanently weakened his health.

It had caused only death and ruin, and it is often considered one of the most costly errors of judgement in military history.