Historical sources on Operation Barbarossa

“On the 23d August 1930, Germany signed the nonaggression pact with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

"The evidence has shown unmistakably that the Soviet Union on their part conformed to the terms of this pact; indeed the German Government itself had been assured of this by the highest German sources. Thus, the German Ambassador in Moscow informed his Government that the Soviet Union would go to war only if attacked by Germany, and this statement is recorded in the German War Diary under the date of June 6, 1941... 

“The demand for the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany was to play a large part in the events preceding the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia; the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles was to become a decisive motive in attempting to justify the policy of the German Government; the demand for land was to be the justification for the acquisition of “living space” at the expense of other nations; the expulsion of the Jews from membership of the race of German blood was to lead to the atrocities against the Jewish people; and the demand for a national army was to result in measures of rearmament on the largest possible scale, and ultimately to war... 

 “On the 18th of December 1940, Adolf Hitler issued directive No. 21, initialled by Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl, which called for the completion of all preparations connected with the realization of “Case Barbarossa” by the 15th May 1941. This directive stated: ‘The German armed forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England . . . Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.’... 

“On the 22d June 1941, without any declaration of war, Germany invaded Soviet territory in accordance with the plans so long made. The evidence which has been given before this Tribunal proves that Germany had the design carefully thought out, to crush the USSR as a political and military power, so that Germany might expand to the east, according to her own desire.” 

Contextual statement:

This source is a published judgement text from the post-war International Military Tribunal. The authoring body is the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg; its judgment was issued on October 1, 1946 and published in 1947 by the U.S. Government Printing Office. The purpose is to state the tribunal’s findings in the major war-crimes trial. 

Bibliographical reference:

International Military Tribunal. (1947). Nazi conspiracy and aggression: Opinion and judgment. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. (p. 5, 43-4).  

Copyright: Public domain 

“Actually, Germany had little choice in the matter of launching the campaigns in the Balkans. Once Benito Mussolini had committed the blunder of thrusting his blunt sword across the Albanian border into Greece and had suffered bitter reverses, Hitler felt obliged to rescue his brother-in-arms. Aside from reasons of prestige, Hitler’s hand was forced by the British occupation of Crete and other Greek islands as well as by subsequent Russian and British political activities in the Balkans.”  

“Because of the annual spring floods in eastern Poland and western European Russia, 15 May was the earliest possible date for the start of the invasion of Russia. No postponement was mentioned before the Yugoslav revolt, which had an immediate effect on the plans for Operation BARBAROSSA. As early as 27 March Hitler estimated that the campaign against Yugoslavia would delay the invasion by about four weeks. This estimate was based on the diversion of forces for the assembly against Yugoslavia. … The plans for the invasion of Russia were modified in accordance with this estimate. On 7 April Field Marshal von Brauchitsch issued an order in which he explained that Operation 25 necessitated changes in the preparations for the Russian campaign postponing it between four and six weeks. The new target date was to be 22 June. Subsequent conferences between Hitler and his military advisers confirmed this new date for D-day, and it was adhered to in the end.” 

Contextual statement: 

This extract is from a U.S. Army historical study written by the U.S. Department of the Army; Department of the Army. Pamphlet 20–260 was published in 1953 as an official military study of the 1941 Balkan campaigns. The purpose is professional military education and operational history, and the perspective is U.S. Army historical analysis that draws on wartime Allied reporting and captured German records about Axis decision-making tied to Mussolini’s Greece campaign. 

Bibliographical reference:

United States Department of the Army. (1953). The German campaigns in the Balkans (Spring 1941) (Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20–260). Washington, DC: Department of the Army. (p. 148, 150).  

Copyright: Public domain

“Hitler’s ideas on the future destiny of Moscow and its population were explained in an order issued on 12 October. According to this order the capitulation of Moscow was not to be accepted if the Russians decided to surrender the city. Time bombs and booby traps had endangered German lives during the seizure of Kyiv, and no risks were to be taken at Moscow or Leningrad... 

“The three weeks from 14 November to 5 December 1941 marked the turning point in the Russian campaign. The German offensive ground to a halt along the entire front. At the same time the Russians began to seize the initiative... 

 “On 8 December Hitler issued a directive to the three services in which he acknowledged that the surprisingly early start of severe winter weather and the supply difficulties caused thereby called for immediate cessation of all major offensive operations and a switch to the defensive... 

“When it turned out that no more German rifles were available and all captured ones had been issued, Hitler authorized an increase in rifle production. There were other shortages ; the officer personnel, for instance, had been so decimated that all reserves were exhausted, with no replacements scheduled to become available before April 1942. The total casualties suffered by the German Army in Russia from 22 June to 31 December 1941 were 830,903, including 26,755 officers.” 

Contextual statement: 

This extract comes from a U.S. Army pamphlet in the “German Report Series,” built from German records and post-war German military writings translated and edited for U.S. Army historical study. It was created by the U.S. Department of the Army; Department of the Army Pamphlet 20–261a was published in 1955 as an operational history and planning study of the 1940–1942 campaign. 

Bibliographical reference:  

United States Department of the Army. (1955). The German campaign in Russia: Planning and operations (1940–1942) (Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20–261a). Washington, DC: Department of the Army. (p. 82, 87, 92, 101).  

Copyright: Public domain

Contextual statement: 

Clifford Kennedy Berryman (1869-1949), American artist and cartoonist, is the orignator of the Teddy Bear during Theodore Roosevelt's presidency.

Bibliographical reference:  

Berryman, C.K. (December 14, 1941). "I think they've been eating too many of their own words", Washington Evening Star. (As found in US National Archives. Public Domain. Source: https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6012245).

Copyright: Out of copyright