
By the early twentieth century, the great powers of Europe had formed two alliance systems that competed with one another and held the continent in an uneasy balance.
The Triple Entente was built around France and Russia, with Britain as the third partner, and aimed to contain German influence, while the Central Powers were dominated by Germany and Austria-Hungary and tried to protect their own important interests.
As a result, Europe entered a period of militarised diplomacy, where each crisis threatened to trigger a wider war and where the terms of alliances made restraint increasingly difficult.
Initially, the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894 was based on a political agreement that had been reached in 1891 and followed by a military agreement that had been signed on 17 August 1892 and had been approved in January 1894.
It largely created the foundation for the Triple Entente. French leaders were still bitter about their defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and saw the alliance as particularly important for security, while Russian officials needed additional support against threats from both Germany and Austria-Hungary, which continued to increase.
The alliance required immediate mobilisation if either power became involved in a war against the Triple Alliance, and military cooperation between French and Russian staff officers soon followed.
Eventually, the Entente expanded when Britain moved away from its policy of diplomatic isolation.
On 8 April 1904, the Entente Cordiale between France and Britain largely resolved decades of colonial disputes that involved Egypt and Morocco in particular, and significantly improved diplomatic relations.
Although the agreement lacked a direct military clause, it opened the way for regular talks between senior officials and helped prepare the way for later military planning.
Among those who were involved in this staff planning were General Henry Wilson for Britain and General Joseph Joffre for France.
In 1907, Britain reached a similar understanding with Russia through the Anglo-Russian Convention, signed on 31 August.
The agreement addressed tensions in Central Asia that had lasted for a long time by a division of Persia into spheres of influence and by a settlement of the rival claims in Afghanistan and Tibet, yet it did not contain any provisions for military cooperation.
Over time, the Entente powers moved from mutual understanding toward a common strategy.
In fact, British and French generals began to plan the deployment of the British Expeditionary Force, which was a body of approximately 70,000 to 80,000 men, in the event of a German attack, while Russian officials restated their promise to defend Serbia from Austro-Hungarian aggression.
Although the Entente lacked a central command or binding military treaty across all three powers, its strength mainly came from coordinated diplomacy and regular consultation, reinforced by a shared suspicion of German intentions.
Italy had been formally tied to Germany and Austria-Hungary through the Triple Alliance and had begun to drift toward the Entente.
Secret agreements with France and tensions with Austria-Hungary over territorial aims in the Adriatic that continued for years gradually weakened Italy’s commitment to its original allies.
By 1915, Italian leaders had negotiated a new alliance with Britain and France through the Treaty of London, which was signed on 26 April, which offered support in exchange for promises of South Tyrol and Istria together with the Dodecanese Islands.
However, Italian claims to Dalmatia remained disputed, as the region had been promised to Serbia.
At the core of the Central Powers stood Germany and Austria-Hungary. Their cooperation began with the Dual Alliance that was signed on 7 October 1879 and promised mutual military support if either were attacked by Russia and neutrality if either faced war with any other power.
German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck believed that Austria-Hungary could act as a stable partner in Central Europe, and Austrian leaders welcomed German strength as protection against Slavic nationalism and Russian intervention.
Later, on 20 May 1882, Italy joined to create the Triple Alliance. Italian policymakers hoped to protect themselves from French aggression, but their alliance with Austria-Hungary remained strained.
Territorial disputes that had lasted for a long time, particularly over South Tyrol and Dalmatian coastal regions, often prevented full trust between Rome and Vienna.
Although Italy renewed the agreement several times, its leaders viewed the alliance as a short-term arrangement rather than a firm commitment.
Meanwhile, Germany began to build closer relations with the Ottoman Empire, which had grown weaker.
After a series of military defeats in the Balkans and North Africa, the Ottomans had needed foreign assistance to modernise their army, and Germany had supplied officers and advisers.
On 2 August 1914, the two powers had signed a secret treaty of alliance, although the Ottoman Empire did not formally enter the war until late October.
Ottoman leaders, who were led in particular by Enver Pasha, hoped that war would reverse recent losses, while German officials believed that Ottoman involvement would draw British forces away from the European front.
In 1915, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers because it rivalled Serbia and had suffered territorial losses in the Second Balkan War.
German and Austro-Hungarian leaders promised support for Bulgarian claims, and Bulgaria agreed that it would attack Serbia from the east.
Bulgaria had already signed a military alliance with Germany on 6 September, and on 14 October, it formally entered the war.
Each new member of the alliance brought military advantages, yet the internal unity of the Central Powers remained quite limited.
For example, German officers such as Falkenhayn and later Hindenburg dominated military planning, and the conflicting goals of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria together with the Ottomans often led to friction.
Each alliance in theory demanded different levels of commitment. The Triple Alliance required its members to support one another only in the event of a defensive war that involved two or more major powers.
Since Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia in July 1914 without coming under attack from more than one enemy, Italy used this clause to justify its decision to remain neutral, at least in the early stages of the conflict.
By contrast, the Franco-Russian Alliance contained clearer terms. If either country was attacked by Germany or Austria-Hungary, the other would mobilise its forces without delay.
Military planning between the two powers had improved over time, and by the outbreak of war, both had detailed agreements for joint action.
French leaders believed that Russian mobilisation would pressure Germany on the eastern front, easing the burden on French forces in the west.
On 31 July 1914, Germany issued an ultimatum to Russia and gave it twelve hours to halt mobilisation.
Although Britain’s agreements with France and Russia did not include automatic military duties, they created much strong expectations.
British and French generals held joint staff talks, and the British Expeditionary Force was prepared to support French operations in the event of German aggression.
By 1914, British policymakers recognised that failure to support France would damage their international reputation and leave them diplomatically isolated in future conflicts.
The alliances operated on more than written clauses, as public opinion and national pride, which were supported by fear of betrayal, influenced decisions as much as the treaties themselves.
Once mobilisation orders were issued, diplomatic options narrowed very quickly because military timetables required rapid decisions, and leaders believed that delays would allow the enemy to gain the upper hand.
As a result, the alliances created a structure where national security depended on a decision to act first instead of a decision to wait, not careful negotiation.
After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914, Austria-Hungary blamed Serbia and prepared for war and German officials offered their support with no conditions, which encouraged Vienna to act swiftly before international pressure could stop them.
On 23 July, Austria-Hungary issued an ultimatum to Serbia with demands that seemed to be meant to be rejected.
When Serbia had accepted most terms but had refused some, Austria-Hungary declared war on 28 July.
Immediately, Russia began partial mobilisation to protect Serbia, and, as a result, German leaders interpreted this as a hostile act and warned Russia to stop.
When Russia had refused, Germany declared war on 1 August. Two days later, Germany declared war on France.
The Schlieffen Plan, which had aimed to defeat France in six weeks and then move against Russia, required a German advance through Belgium.
This breach of Belgian neutrality was a breach of neutrality that the Treaty of London, signed in 1839, had protected, and it triggered Britain’s entry into the war on 4 August.
Each move set off a response because the alliances, instead of stopping a war, acted as triggers.
Austria-Hungary’s aggression drew in Russia, and Russia’s mobilisation in turn drew in Germany.
Germany’s attack on Belgium directly brought in Britain. The war spread because their treaties and military plans together with fears of isolation removed peaceful alternatives, rather than because the powers wanted it.
Since the countries were bound to act together, the alliances helped turn a local Balkan crisis into a world war.
